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THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE TO REAL PROPERTY
FORFEITURE UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984
INTRODUCTION
The last five years have seen a dramatic increase in the use of both civil
and criminal forfeitures as weapons in the war against drugs.1 Recently,
attention has focused on the drug-related civil forfeiture of real prop-
erty.2 The civil forfeiture of real property used in connection with a fel-
ony narcotics violation is provided for under section 881(a)(7) of United
States Code title 21.1 Section 881(a)(7) includes an affirmative defense,
known as the "innocent owner" defense, which allows a property owner
to avoid the forfeiture of his real property by showing that the proscribed
use of that property occurred "without [his] knowledge or consent.",4
Courts have interpreted section 88 l(a)(7) and its "innocent owner" de-
fense inconsistently in at least three areas: the threshold determination
of whether real property is subject to forfeiture; the construction of the
phrase "without knowledge or consent" in the defense; and the applica-
bility of the constitutional defense to property forfeiture established in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.5 The purpose of this Note is
1. See D. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases, 1 1.01, at 1-1 (1989);
Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: What Process Is Due, 41 Sw.
L.J. 1111, 1127-28 (1988); Note, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 390, 391 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Johnson, Vermont Ponders Spirit of the Law on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Oct.
24, 1989, at A18, col. 5 (community questions forfeiture of family farm in Vermont upon
which marijuana plants were grown).
3. Section 881(a)(7) was introduced through the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, and amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. Section 881(a)(7)
authorizes the forfeiture of real property "which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission" of a felony violation of the
federal narcotics laws. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
Real property is also subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a)(6) when the gov-
ernment can show that the property was bought or sold in connection with a narcotics
exchange. See, e.g., United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 870 F.2d 586, 589
n.5 (11 th Cir. 1989) (civil forfeiture action brought against real property under section
881(a)(6)); United States v. Premises Known as 8584 Old Brownsville Road, 736 F.2d
1129, 1130 (6th Cir. 1984) ("the term 'all proceeds' in § 881(a)(6) is unambiguous and
includes all types of property, both real and personal"). Section 881(a)(6) was introduced
by the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768, and also
amends the civil forfeiture scheme in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act. Section 88 1(a)(6) provides for the civil forfeiture of real and personal prop-
erty that consists of, or is traceable to, "all proceeds" of a narcotics exchange. See 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
4. The innocent owner defense to section 881(a)(7) provides that "no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); see also id.
§ 881(a)(6) (subsection (a)(6) contains identical language).
5. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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to suggest an analysis for the innocent owner defense under section
881(a)(7) that would replace this inconsistent treatment.
Part I of this Note offers a background discussion on forfeiture law.
Part II argues that only real property shown to be substantially con-
nected to a drug-related offense should be subject to forfeiture under sec-
tion 881(a)(7). Part III argues that the phrase "without knowledge or
consent" in the innocent owner defense be read disjunctively, thus al-
lowing the owner an independent lack of consent defense even if that
owner fails to establish lack of knowledge of the illegal drug-related ac-
tivity. Finally, in Part IV, this Note argues that courts should apply the
Calero-Toledo standard of "reasonable precaution" in determining
whether a claimant has proven lack of consent.
I. FORFEITURE LAW
Forfeiture occurs when the government takes illegally used or ac-
quired property6 without compensating the owner.7 Although many of
the present-day characteristics of civil forfeiture law and procedure may
be traced to origins in the early stages of English common law,8 the for-
feiture of both real and personal property is based exclusively on statu-
tory authority.9 Several federal statutes authorize the forfeiture of
property that represents the proceeds of certain criminal activity, or that
is used in furtherance of such activity. ' 0
6. There are generally two types of property subject to forfeiture in connection with
a narcotics violation. See United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
see also Winn, supra note 1, at 1118-20 (four-part classification). "Contraband per se"
includes controlled substances themselves, and the raw materials and equipment used to
grow or manufacture controlled substances. The mere possession of contraband per se
constitutes a crime, and such materials may be seized and forfeited automatically. See
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965); Farrell, 606 F.2d at
1344; Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil
Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 Whittier L. Rev. 27, 30 (1989); Comment, Civil
Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties, 3 N. Ill. L. Rev. 323, 336 (1983). "Derivative
contraband" includes materials that are not inherently illegal, but that are subject to
forfeiture because of their connection to unlawful drug-related activity. See Darmstadter
& Mackoff, supra, at 30; Comment, supra, at 336-37. Unless otherwise indicated all refer-
ences to property in this Note will be to derivative contraband.
7. See United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1
(C.D. Cal. 1978); D. Smith, supra note 1, 2.01, at 2-1.
8. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-83; D. Smith, supra note 1, t 2.02, at 2-2;
Note, supra note 1, at 390-91; see also Comment, supra note 6, at 326-29 (historical dis-
cussion of various types of forfeitures developed in England).
9. See Farrell, 606 F.2d at 1345-46 & n.10; Asset Forfeiture Office, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Vol. 1, Asset Forfeiture: Law, Practice and Policy 9 (1988) [hereinafter Asset
Forfeiture]; Comment, supra note 6, at 331.
10. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988) (property in interstate commerce derived from
violation of antitrust laws); id. § 1177 (property used in connection with illegal gam-
bling); 16 U.S.C. §§ 65, 128, 171, 256c (1988) (guns and other equipment used unlawfully
in national parks); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (forfeiture of property used in connection
with a violation of RICO); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1988) (adulterated or misbranded food,
drugs, or cosmetics); id. § 853 (criminal forfeiture of property used or acquired in con-
nection with a violation of narcotics laws); id. § 881 (civil forfeiture of property used or
REAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE
Forfeitures can be either criminal or civil proceedings." A criminal
forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, ancillary to the prosecution of a
criminal defendant, and may proceed only in the event of a conviction of
that defendant.12 In contrast, a civil forfeiture proceeds in rem, that is,
against the property to be forfeited. 13 In rem forfeiture proceedings are
brought based on the legal fiction that the property itself is guilty. 4 The
government need not convict or even indict the property owner.' 5
Actual or constructive seizure of the property to be forfeited is a juris-
dictional prerequisite in a civil forfeiture action.' 6 Once seized, property
may be forfeited in one of three types of proceedings: summary forfei-
ture, administrative forfeiture, or judicial forfeiture.'7 In a summary for-
feiture, property is seized and forfeited to the government without any
notice or hearing. Only contraband per se-materials the mere posses-
sion of which is unlawful-is subject to summary forfeiture.' 8 In an ad-
ministrative forfeiture, property seized by a governmental agency, such
as the Customs Service, may be forfeited to the United States without the
acquired in connection with a violation of narcotics laws); see also Note, supra note 1, at
392 & n.17.
11. See D. Smith, supra note 1, 1 1.02, at 1-4.
12. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 2; Comment, supra note 6, at 325. Real
property may be forfeited pursuant to a drug-related criminal forfeiture proceeding under
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (RICO) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (criminal forfeiture provi-
sion of Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984).
13. See Comment, supra note 6, at 325. The in rem nature of civil forfeiture proceed-
ings produces oddly captioned cases, such as United States v. Real Property Known as
19026 Oakmont South Drive, Located in South Bend, Indiana, Saint Joseph County. The
property owner contesting the forfeiture in such a case is referred to by convention as the
claimant.
14. See United States v. $152,160.00 United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356
(D. Colo. 1988); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 3. See generally D. Smith, supra note 1,
2.03, at 2-8 to 2-9 (background material on civil forfeitures).
15. Historically, the innocence or guilt of the owner was not an issue in a civil forfei-
ture proceeding. See, eg., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
683 (1974) ("Despite [the] proliferation of forfeiture enactments, the innocence of the
owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.");
Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877) (the forfeiture "is attached
primarily to the distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection with the
same, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the
owner"). In Calero-Toledo, however, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional de-
fense to property forfeiture. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. Since 1978, stat-
utory "innocent owner" defenses have also been available. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6)-
881(a)(7) (1988).
16. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 396; Pelham v. Rose, 76 U.S. 103, 106 (1869);
Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 63.
There are three primary methods by which the government may seize property and
thus obtain jurisdiction in a forfeiture action. Property may be seized (1) by a fourth
amendment warrant, (2) by a warrant of arrest in rem, or (3) without any warrant at all
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 32-36.
17. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 40-42.
18. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1965);
United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Asset Forfeiture, supra
note 9, at 43.
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intervention of the judiciary. 9
Real property may be forfeited only pursuant to a judicial forfeiture.2"
Judicial forfeitures are civil actions brought and tried in the federal dis-
trict courts. The government begins the process by filing a complaint
against the property pursuant to Rule C(2) of the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.21 Once initiated, the judicial
forfeiture proceeds according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"'except to the extent that they are inconsistent with [the] Supplemental
Rules."22
Some of the procedural rules that govern civil forfeiture actions clearly
favor the government; the allocation of the burden of proof is an exam-
ple. In a criminal forfeiture, the burden of proof rests on the government
to prove each element of the underlying crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.23 In a civil forfeiture action, however, the government has to es-
tablish only "probable cause" to believe that the property is subject to
forfeiture. 24 Probable cause in the forfeiture context is defined as a "rea-
sonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie
proof, but more than mere suspicion. '25 In establishing this reasonable
ground for belief, the government's task is much easier than in the crimi-
nal context. For example, the government's showing of probable cause
may be based entirely on hearsay26 or on circumstantial evidence. 27 As a
19. Customs laws "authorize the administrative forfeiture of property that does not
exceed $100,000 in value, conveyances that are used to transport controlled substances,
and illegally imported goods." Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 43; see 19 U.S.C. § 1607
(1988). According to Justice Department policy, the forfeiture of real property must be
undertaken judicially, regardless the value of the property. See Asset Forfeiture, supra
note 9, at 44; Valukas & Walsh, Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says You Can't Take it
with You, 14 Litigation 31, 31 (Wint. 1988).
20. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 44; Valukas & Walsh, supra note 19, at 35.
21. See United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1011 (E.D.N.C. 1988),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir.
1989). Rule C(2) further requires that "the complaint shall be verified on oath or solemn
affirmation." Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 28
U.S.C. Rule C(2) (1982).
22. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 28 U.S.C. Rule
A (1982). See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 8.
23. See Valukas & Walsh, supra note 19, at 33-34.
24. See United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889
F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. South 23.19 Acres of Land, 694 F. Supp.
1252, 1253 (E.D. La. 1988); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (made applicable to drug-
related forfeitures by 21 U.S.C. § 881(d)).
25. United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.
1981) (quoting United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir.
1980)). This definition also applies in forfeiture cases directed at real property. See
United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 628 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (quoting
$364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d at 323); United States v. One Parcel of Real
Estate, 715 F. Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. One Single Family Resi-
dence, 699 F. Supp. 1531, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 6,
at 35.
26. See, e.g., 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1267 (hearsay evidence is tradi-
tional basis of probable cause showing, and thus, allowable in forfeiture context) (citing
REAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE
practical matter, the government usually meets its initial burden of show-
ing probable cause simply by filing its verified complaint.2"
Perhaps the government's most significant advantage in civil forfeiture
actions is that once probable cause is shown, the burden of proof shifts to
the claimant.2 9 To avoid forfeiture, the property owner must show either
that probable cause does not exist, or that he falls within an affirmative
defense to forfeiture, such as the innocent owner defense.30 An unrebut-
ted showing of probable cause to believe that the property is subject to
forfeiture results in summary judgment in favor of the government.3
II. THE FACILITATION ISSUE
Contraband per se is inherently illegal and subject to forfeiture without
regard to the rights of its owner.32 In contrast, the forfeiture of material
as derivative contraband, 33 including real property forfeited under sec-
tion 881(a)(7), requires that the government show a connection between
the property and a narcotics violation.34 In the absence of an obvious
relation between the property and the offense, this connection generally
turns on a showing that the property was used, or intended to be used, to
United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th
Cir. 1983)); United States v. $250,000.00 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 899
(1st Cir. 1987) (government's showing of probable cause may be made "wholly with
otherwise inadmissible evidence").
27. See United States v. $93,685.61 in United States Currency, 730 F.2d 571, 572 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d
at 324-25; United States v. Certain Real Property Situated at Route 3, 568 F. Supp. 434,
436 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 9, at 92.
28. See Valukas & Walsh, supra note 19, at 34.
29. See One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep C-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759, 761 (8th Cir.
1986); United States v. $83,320.00 in United States Currency and Forty Dollars in Cana-
dian Currency, 682 F.2d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. One Parcel of Real
Estate at 11885 S.W. 46 Street, 715 F. Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
30. See United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889
F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989); One Blue Jeep, 783 F.2d at 761; Real Estate at 11885
S. W 46 Street, 715 F. Supp. at 357.
31. See 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1267; One Blue Jeep, 783 F.2d at 761.
If a judgment of forfeiture is delivered, the claimant may still avoid forfeiture and
regain his property by applying to the Attorney General for remission. See Darmstadter
& Mackoff, supra note 6, at 37-38. See generally D. Smith, supra note 1, 1 15.01-15.04
(discussing remission). Generally, a petition for remission must establish a good faith
interest in the property, lack of knowledge or reason to believe that the property was
being used illegally, and that the petitioner neither knew nor had reason to know that any
previous owner had a record or reputation for violating laws. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.5(b)-
9.5(c); Valukas & Walsh, supra note 19, at 35. A petition for remission is essentially an
appeal for executive grace. Courts have only the narrowest power to review the decision
of the Attorney General. See United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109
Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1989).
32. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965); United
States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra
note 6, at 30.
33. See supra note 6.
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). See generally D. Smith, supra note 1, 3.03
(discussing required nexus between property and underlying narcotics violation).
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facilitate the violation.35
Most courts that have addressed the issue of facilitation have done so
under Section 881(a)(4) of Title 21, which authorizes the forfeiture of
conveyances-trucks, cars, boats and planes-used in connection with a
narcotics violation. Circuit courts have applied different standards to de-
termine whether property has facilitated a narcotics violation and is thus
subject to forfeiture under this provision. 6 Relying on the statutory lan-
guage, one group of courts has broadly held that property "in any man-
ner" connected to the underlying offense is subject to forfeiture.37 On the
other hand, some circuits have adopted a more narrow interpretation of
facilitation, holding that there must be a "substantial connection" be-
tween the property and the underlying offense before that property is
subject to forfeiture.38
Under section 881(a)(7) most courts conclude that a substantial con-
nection between the real property and the drug offense is required to
support a finding of facilitation and subject the property to forfeiture.3 9
35. See D. Smith, supra note 1, 3.03, at 3-14.
36. See United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp.
1005, 1011 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. San-
toro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); Note, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for
Drug-Related Crimes Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 303,
325-28 (1988).
37. See, e.g., 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ("[section] 881 forfei-
ture is proper if the vehicle in question was used 'in any manner' to facilitate the sale or
transportation of a controlled substance"); United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V
Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.) (facilitation element met when there exists "'reason-
able ground for belief that the use of the automobile made the sale less difficult and
allowed it to remain more or less free from obstruction or hindrance' ") (quoting United
States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1956)), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
818 (1981); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 425 (2d
Cir. 1977) (vehicle used to transport drug trafficker to sale, or to pre-arranged meeting
with prospective customer, is subject to forfeiture).
38. See, eg., United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d
947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the "substantial connection" standard follows from
legislative history of section 881(a)(6)); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up,
769 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1985) (use of truck on one occasion to inspect marijuana
crop insufficient to subject truck to forfeiture); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Cor-
vette, 625 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (1st Cir. 1980) (denying forfeiture of an automobile used to
transport claimant to meeting where "front" money was to be reimbursed).
The different standards are clear in cases in which an automobile or plane is merely
used to transport drug dealers to a site for discussing a subsequent drug deal. See D.
Smith, supra note 1, 3.03, at 3-17. Compare One 1974 Cadillac, 548 F.2d at 425 (auto-
mobile held subject to forfeiture though only used to transport dealers to preliminary
meeting) with One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d at 1029-30 (denying forfeiture of
automobile used to transport claimant to meeting where "front" money was to be reim-
bursed). See generally D. Smith, supra note 1, 1 4.02(4)(a), at 4-7 to 4-12 (broad discus-
sion of nexus issue under section 881(a)(4)).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd Street, 869 F.2d 1093,
1098 (8th Cir. 1989) (Arnold, J., concurring) ("[T]here must be a substantial connection
between the property being forfeited and a drug-related crime."); United States v. San-
toro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989) (substantial connection "standard is a common
sense interpretation of [section 881(a)(7)], which is consonant with the congressional in-
REAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE
In adopting the substantial connection standard for real property, many
opinions have relied on the legislative history of section 881(a)(7) in Sen-
ate Report No. 98-225 on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
("Senate Report"). The Senate Report contains a passage which refers to
a structure housing tons of marijuana and a manufacturing laboratory
for amphetamines. 40 From this passage, these courts have gleaned the
congressional intent that forfeiture should not apply when there is only
an incidental or fortuitous connection between the drug offense and the
real property.41
Recently, however, it was argued that this interpretation is invalid.42
The examples used in the Senate Report, one commentator asserted, are
not germane to the facilitation issue, but rather are used simply to high-
light a serious problem by way of vivid example.43 One federal district
court has also held that property "in any manner" related to a drug of-
fense should be subject to forfeiture under section 881(a)(7). 4
Courts should continue to require more than a fortuitous or coinciden-
tal nexus between real property and the underlying criminal offense
before that property is subject to forfeiture under section 881(a)(7).
Although the legislative history of section 881(a)(7) is very sparse,45 the
tent that the instrumentalities of the drug trade be reached, while ensuring that property
only fortuitously connected with drug trafficking be preserved"); United States v. Real
Property and Residence at 31 N.W. 136th Court, 711 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (S.D. Fla.
1989) ("To support a forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. [section] 881(a)(7), the Government
must establish probable cause to believe that a substantial connection exists between the
property to be forfeited and an illegal exchange of a controlled substance."); United
States v. One Piece of Property Located on Trafalgar Street, 700 F. Supp. 857, 861 n.5
(D.S.C. 1988) (noting that "the 'substantial connection' standard is also appropriate
under § 881(a)(7)"); United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1016 (E.D.N.C.
1988) ("the applicable standard for determining whether a premises was 'used' to 'facili-
tate' a drug transaction is the stricter 'substantial connection' test"), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub non. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
$12,585.00 in United States Currency, 669 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D. Minn. 1987) ("The
legislative history of section 881(a)(7) indicates that courts should similarly require a
substantial connection before ordering forfeiture of real property."), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.
1989); United States v. All Those Certain Lots, 657 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1987)
("real property may be subject to forfeiture under [section 881(a)(7)] only where there is
a substantial connection between the property and the underlying illegal transaction").
But see United States v. Property Identified as 3120 Banneker Drive, 691 F. Supp. 497,
500 (D.D.C. 1988) (court applies broader "in any manner" test).
40. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3378 [hereinafter Senate Report].
41. See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing
Senate Report); $12,585 in United States Currency, 669 F. Supp. at 943 ("The example
and language used in the Senate report illustrate Congress' intent to subject real property
to forfeiture only if the property is substantially connected to illegal drug activity."); All
Those Certain Lots, 657 F. Supp. at 1064-65 (citing Senate Report).
42. See Note, supra note 36, at 328.
43. See id.
44. See United States v. Property Identified as 3120 Banneker Drive, 691 F. Supp.
497, 500 (D.D.C. 1988).
45. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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often cited Senate Report, which refers to property that was "indispensa-
ble to the commission of a major drug offense,"46 provides sufficient gui-
dance in determining the intent of Congress in passing the real property
amendment.47 The argument that the Senate Report examples are merely
egregious examples of the problem and an expression of Congress' frus-
tration is not convincing. In the absence of specific language in the legis-
lative history of section 881(a)(7) on the facilitation issue, it is valid to
use the Senate Report examples as indicative of Congressional intent on
this issue. Indeed, the vast majority of courts have done just that.48
Based on the nature of these examples, it is reasonable to conclude that
Congress did not intend for real property only circumstantially or fortui-
tously connected to a drug violation to be subject to forfeiture. 49
Moreover, policy considerations suggest that real property, especially
homes, should not be subject to forfeiture on the basis of a circumstantial
relationship to a prohibited act. The home has traditionally been pro-
vided extra protection by courts.5 0 If Congress had intended section
881(a)(7) to reach homes less than substantially related to a drug offense,
it is reasonable to expect that a specific reference to such a shift in policy
would have been made. These policy considerations become more im-
portant when the procedural disadvantages to claimants in civil forfei-
ture actions are considered. 1
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE
A. United States v. Liberty Avenue
United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02
46. Senate Report, supra note 40, at 3378.
47. In declaring that the scope of civil forfeiture was "too limited," Congress was
concerned that real property not subject to forfeiture under section 881(a)(6), but other-
wise involved in a drug-related activity, could slip through what was intended to be a
comprehensive forfeiture scheme. See id. It seems highly unlikely, however, that Con-
gress intended "that [section 881(a)(7)] be employed to impose drastic penalties on those
who cultivate or traffic in small quantities of controlled substances." D. Smith, supra
note 1, 1 4.02(6), at 4-16.
Additionally, the legislative history to section 881(a)(6) states that "[d]ue to the penal
nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the intent of these provisions that property would be
forfeited only if there is a substantial connection between the property and the underlying
criminal activity which the statute seeks to prevent." Joint Explanatory Statement of
Titles II and III, 124 Cong. Rec. S17647 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 9518, 9522 (emphasis added).
48. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
49. See D. Smith, supra note 1, 4.02(6), at 4-16.
50. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (fourth amend-
ment standard on reasonable searches is stricter with respect to homes and offices than
with respect to automobiles); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir.
1989) ("the home has a protected place in our jurisprudence"); United States v. All Those
Certain Lots, 657 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("[C]ourts have traditionally
drawn a distinction between one's personal property and one's home, according the latter
far greater protection under the law.").
51. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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Liberty Avenue 2 first raised a question concerning the interpretation of
the innocent owner defense which is now confronting an increasing
number of federal courts.53 The innocent owner defense states that prop-
erty shall not be forfeited under section 881(a) "by reason of any act or
omission established by [the] owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner."54 The question raised in
Liberty Avenue was whether a property owner 5 can assert the innocent
owner defense on the basis of lack of consent, even though he admits to
having knowledge of the drug-related use of his property. 6
The claimant in Liberty Avenue lived on Long Island, New York, and
owned a two-story building in Jamaica, Queens. The property was noto-
rious as a haven for drug-related activity, and the police had contacted
the owner requesting that he press criminal charges against trespassers.57
At first the owner cooperated with the police. Efforts to curb drug traf-
ficking at the site were unsuccessful, however, and the United States At-
torey for the Eastern District of New York eventually had the property
seized and brought the forfeiture action. 8
The government argued that to assert the innocent owner defense suc-
cessfully, the claimant must show both lack of knowledge and lack of
consent. 9 Claimant, on the other hand, asserted that lack of consent
represents an independent way of satisfying the requirements of the inno-
cent owner defense, and that therefore he could prevail by showing that
he did not consent to the criminal use of his property.6" The Liberty
Avenue court held that a textual analysis of section 881(a)(7) was suffi-
52. 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
53. The same issue was raised in the Third Circuit, see United States v. Parcel of Real
Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (petition for rehear-
ing); United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618
(3rd Cir. 1989), and most recently in the Northern District of Alabama. See United
States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
55. In order to make out the affirmative defense of innocent ownership, the claimant
must first establish an interest in the property. See United States v. Certain Real Prop-
erty, 724 F. Supp. 908, 913 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The analysis in this Note assumes that
claimants are the property owners, that is, holders of a fee interest in the property. The
innocent owner defense may also be available to a third party holding a security or other
lesser interest in the property subject to forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. $321,470.00,
United States Currency, 874 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1989) (possessory interest which
is "colorably lawful" is sufficient); United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency and Traveler's
Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 1986) (valid security interest perfected before
illegal act occurred is sufficient).
56. United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Liberty
Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 49 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
57. See Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. at 47.
58. See id. at 48.
59. See id. at 49. This is consistent with a conjunctive construction of the phrase
"knowledge or consent."




cient to resolve the issue.61 Noting that, in accord with "canons" of stat-
utory interpretation, terms separated by the word "or" must be read
disjunctively, the court concluded that a claimant could achieve innocent
owner status by showing either that he lacked knowledge of, or had not
consented to, the drug-related use of his property.62
To date, three other courts have followed Liberty Avenue's disjunctive
interpretation of "knowledge or consent."63 Another group of district
courts, however, seems to require that the claimant show he lacked both
knowledge and consent in order mount a successful innocent owner de-
fense." While the Liberty Avenue court was correct in holding that
"knowledge or consent" should be read in the disjunctive, 65 arguments
which support the opposite conclusion suggest that Liberty Avenue and
subsequent cases reached the right result for the wrong reasons.
B. Flaws in the Liberty Avenue Analysis
A strict logical interpretation of the innocent owner language in sec-
tion 881(a)(7) requires a different result from that obtained in Liberty
Avenue.66 A principle of logic, known as De Morgan's theorem, states
61. See id. at 50.
62. The court concluded that section 881(a)(7) creates "an affirmative defense where
the illegal acts giving rise to the forfeiture occurred without the knowledge or without the
consent of the owner. If Congress had meant to require a showing of lack of knowledge
in all cases... it could have done so by replacing 'or' with 'and.'" Id.
63. See United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886
F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1418-19
(N.D. Ala. 1990); United States v. Real Property Known as 19026 Oakmont South
Drive, 715 F. Supp. 233, 237 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
The Liberty Avenue opinion has created its own "common law" in the federal courts.
As stated in Sixty Acres, "[tihis court sees no reason why the Eleventh Circuit should not
follow the Third Circuit, which, in turn, followed the Eastern District of New York in
171-02 Liberty Avenue and gave the disjunctive word, 'or,' its ordinary meaning." Sixty
Acres, 727 F. Supp. at 1419.
64. See, eg., United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, Case No. 88-14167-CIV
(Davis, J.) (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 1989) ("Thus, a claimant can succeed on the 'innocent
owner' defense under § 881(a)(7) by merely proving that he lacked knowledge of the
illegal activity and that he did not consent to the activity.") (emphasis added); United
States v. Premises Known as 1908-1910 Jackson Street, Civ. A. 86-1389 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(1987 WL 13086) ("To withstand summary judgment on [the innocent owner defense],
the claimants must prove that at the time the act or omission giving rise to the potential
forfeiture occurred: (1) they were owners of the property in question and (2) they had no
knowledge of nor gave their consent to the illegal acts committed there.") (emphasis ad-
ded); United States v. 124 East North Avenue, 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
("When trial on the merits of this case occurs, [claimant] will have an opportunity to
prove she had no knowledge of and gave no consent to her husband's alleged unlawful
activities.") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as
6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 1989) (petition for rehearing) (Greenberg,
J., dissenting) (arguing that an owner must prove lack of both knowledge and consent to
succeed in presenting an innocent owner defense).
65. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
66. This argument is drawn from the government's brief in support of a petition to
take an immediate appeal of the summary judgment in Liberty Avenue pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. V 1988) (brief on file at Fordham Law Review).
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that "the denial of a conjunction [not A and B] is equivalent to the alter-
nation of the denials [not A or not B] and the denial of an alternation
[not A or B] is equivalent to the conjunction of the denials [not A and not
B]."6 7 Section 881(a)(7) provides that an owner must establish that the
proscribed act was committed "without the knowledge or consent of
[the] owner." Because "without the knowledge or consent of [the]
owner" is a denial of an alternation, De Morgan's theorem would indi-
cate that the owner must be without both knowledge and consent (the
conjunction of the denials) in order to meet the innocent owner defense.68
Accordingly, the Liberty Avenue court may erroneously have focused on
the word "or" without recognizing the logical context in which that
word was used.
The Liberty Avenue analysis may further be flawed in its reliance on
certain standards of statutory construction. The court stated that nor-
mal canons of statutory construction require words separated by "or" to
be read in the disjunctive.69 This reasoning has influenced other courts
addressing the same question of statutory construction; these courts all
have referred to the "canons" of statutory construction in their analyses,
while citing to Liberty Avenue.70 A closer examination of the cases cited
by Liberty Avenue in support of this proposition,71 however, reveals that
the court's reliance on them may have been misplaced.
For example the Liberty Avenue court cited Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.72
67. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 600 (1986 Unabridged) (emphasis
added); see also I. Copi, Symbolic Logic 27 (4th ed. 1973) ("since a disjunction asserts
merely that at least one disjunct is true, to negate it is to assert that both are false. Negat-
ing the disjunction p v q amounts to asserting the conjunction of the negations of p and
68. A simple example illustrates the application of De Morgan's theorem. Consider
the statement, "In order to go to school, you must not have a fever or a sore throat." The
clear meaning of this statement is that one cannot go to school unless he is completely
well. Having either a sore throat or a fever would keep him home in bed. The analysis
would be the same for section 881(a)(7). In order to be an innocent owner, the claimant
must be without "knowledge or consent." De Morgan's theorem suggests that the claim-
ant must lack both of these elements in order to achieve innocent owner status. As he
must be without both, having either would deny him innocent ownership. In terms of the
facts of Liberty Avenue, because the owner had knowledge (that is, he failed to lack
knowledge), it would appear that a necessary condition of innocent ownership was not
obtained. Thus, according to this logical analysis, the court should have granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the government.
It should be noted that research thus far has not revealed any cases that have employed
De Morgan's theorem to resolve a question of statutory construction.
69. See United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Lib-
erty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
70. See United States v. Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618,
626 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1419; United States
v. Real Property Known as 19026 Oakmont South Drive, 715 F. Supp. 233, 237 n.3
(N.D. Ind. 1989).
71. See Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. at 50 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 338-39 (1979); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978)).
72. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
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Reiter involved a suit brought under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.73 The
question presented to the Court was whether consumers sustain an injury
in their "business or property" within the meaning of Section 4 when
they are forced to pay higher prices for personal goods as a result of an
antitrust violation.74 Respondents (defendants) argued that the phrase
"business or property" meant a business activity or a business related-
property.75 The Court rejected this argument, stating that respondent's
"strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive 'or' and rob
the term 'property' of its independent and ordinary significance."76
Reiter v. Sonotone may be distinguished from Liberty Avenue on two
grounds. First, the alternative in Section 4, "business or property," is
not cast in the negative. Therefore, a disjunctive reading of the term
"business or property" does not conflict with the premise of De Morgan's
theorem. The phrase "without the knowledge or consent" in section
881(a)(7), on the other hand, is cast in the negative; the innocent owner
must show that the proscribed act was committed without his knowledge
or consent. Second, the question in Reiter concerned a definitionally-
based distinction between the terms business and property. The issue
was whether "business" in any way modified or affected the meaning of
the term "property."77
In contrast, the issue in Liberty Avenue constitutes an operationally-
based dispute as to the effect of the terms knowledge and consent. The
question is not simply over what these terms mean, nor whether one
term's meaning affects that of the other. Rather, the issue is whether the
claimant must lack either, or both knowledge and consent in order to
achieve innocent owner status. The Court in Reiter stated that terms
connected by a disjunctive are given separate meanings, "unless the con-
text dictates otherwise."78 The context of section 881(a)(7)-the nega-
tively cast alternation and the focus on the operational effect of the
terms-suggests that a disjunctive reading of "knowledge or consent"
would be inappropriate.79
73. See id. at 335. The Clayton Act, Section 4 provides: "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States .... " 15(a) U.S.C. § 15
(1988).
74. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 334.
75. Id. at 338.
76. Id. at 338-39. The Court continued, "[c]anons of construction ordinarily suggest
that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context
dictates otherwise." Id. at 339.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. The second case cited by Liberty Avenue in support of its statutory interpretation
of the phrase "knowledge or consent" is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978). Pacifica Foundation involved a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 that regulates the
use of "obscene, indecent, or profane" speech in a public broadcast. See id. at 731; 18
U.S.C. § 1464 (1988). Respondents (defendants) argued that because their broadcast
lacked "prurient appeal," they did not fall within the statute, because while prurient




In determining the proper construction of the innocent owner defense
to section 881 (a)(7), the Liberty Avenue court relied entirely on the lan-
guage of the statute.80 Because congressional intent is not clear from the
language of the statute itself, however, it is appropriate to examine the
statute's legislative history to determine congressional intent." The leg-
islative history surrounding section 881 (a)(7) is very sparse;82 the Senate
Report discussing the newly-adopted real property provision contains
only two substantive passages. The first discusses the need for a real
property provision to the civil forfeiture laws in order to close a loophole
in the existing civil forfeiture scheme.83 The second describes the pro-
posed real property section itself.8 4 This second passage contains the
only reference to the innocent owner defense in the legislative history of
profane. See Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 739. The premise of respondent's argu-
ment apparently was that the communication must be obscene, indecent and profane in
order to fall within the proscription of the statute. The Court rejected this argument,
noting that the descriptive terms were written in the disjunctive, which implies that each
has a separate meaning. See id. at 739-40.
Pacifica Foundation may be distinguished from Liberty Avenue on the ground that the
phrase "obscene, indecent, or profane" is not cast in the negative. A disjunctive interpre-
tation of section 1464, therefore, does not conflict with De Morgan's theorem. Reliance
by Liberty Avenue on this case in support of a disjunctive construction of "knowledge or
consent" may also have been misplaced.
80. See United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Lib-
erty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
81. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1976);
First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1990) (No. 89-728); United States v.
Noe, 634 F.2d 860, 861 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 876 (1981).
82. See United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886
F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1989). The real property amendment to the civil forfeiture provi-
sion of the Crime Control Act of 1984 was only a small part of a very large body of penal
legislation. Additionally, the forfeiture title of the 1984 Act focused primarily on crimi-
nal forfeitures. See id. at 624; see also Senate Report, supra note 40, at 3374 ("Title III of
the bill.., is designed to enhance the use of forfeiture, and in particular, the sanction of
criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combatting... racketeering and drug
trafficking.").
83. The passage states:
The extent of drug-related property subject to civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
[section] 881 is also too limited in one respect. Under current law, if a person
uses a boat or car to transport narcotics or uses equipment to manufacture dan-
gerous drugs, his use of the property renders it subject to civil forfeiture. But if
he uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manu-
facturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision to subject his real
property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was indispensable to the com-
mission of a major drug offense and the prospect of the forfeiture of the prop-
erty would have been a powerful deterrent.
Senate Report, supra note 40, at 3378 (footnote omitted).
84. This passage states:
The first amendment would add to the list of property subject to civil forfeiture
set out in section 881(a) real property which is used or intended to be used in a
felony violation of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. This provision
would also include an "innocent owner" exception like that now included in
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section 881(a)(7). The Senate Report did not make any specific com-
ments as to whether the phrase "knowledge or consent" should be read
disjunctively or conjunctively. Thus, the legislative history of section
881(a)(7) provides no direct basis for answering this question.
Nor does the legislative history surrounding the innocent owner de-
fense in section 881(a)(6) provide a clear basis for determining whether
"or" really means "and" in section 881(a)(7).8 s In its most direct state-
ment concerning the defense, Congress stated that "property would not
be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property knew or con-
sented to the fact" that the property was associated with a drug-related
activity.86
On its face this language indicates that either knowledge of or consent
to the proscribed act would result in forfeiture. This implies that the
owner would have to prove the lack of both these elements to avoid for-
feiture, which is equivalent to a conjunctive interpretation of the
defense. 87
On the other hand, the statement also places the burden of proof on
the government. The language, in effect, creates a presumption against
forfeiture unless the government can show that the owner either knew or
consented to the illegal activity. This effect is clearly inconsistent with
the well-established legal analysis in forfeiture cases, which places the
burden of proof with the claimant once the government has shown prob-
able cause to support the forfeiture.88 The legislative history in section
881(a)(6), therefore, does not provide an unambiguous basis for deter-
mining whether Congress meant "without the knowledge or consent of
[the] owner" to mean that a claimant must always establish lack of
knowledge to achieve innocent owner status.
those provisions permitting the civil forfeiture of certain vehicles and moneys or
securities.
Id. at 3398 (emphasis added).
85. Reference to the legislative history in section 881(a)(6) is relevant because Con-
gress referred to section 881(a)(6) in describing the section 881(a)(7) innocent owner de-
fense, and because section 881(a)(6) contains identical innocent owner language. See
6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d at 625.
86. In full the passage states:
Finally it should be pointed out that no property would be forfeited under the
Senate amendment to the extent of the interest of any innocent owner of such
property .... Specifically the property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the
owner of such property knew or consented to the fact that:
1. the property was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of law,
2. the property was proceeds traceable to such an illegal exchange, or
3. the property was used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of
Federal illicit drug laws.
Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III to the Psychotropic Substances Act of
1978, 124 Cong. Ree. S17647 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
9518, 9522-23 (emphasis added).
87. See United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 890
F.2d 659, 662 (3d Cir. 1989) (petition for rehearing) (Greenberg, J., dissenting).




Despite the apparent flaws in the Liberty Avenue analysis, and the am-
biguity in the legislative history of section 881(a)(6), courts should con-
strue the innocent owner defense disjunctively and allow the property
owner a separate lack of consent defense. As stated in United States v.
Menasche,89 a court must "'give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute.' "90 The Liberty Avenue opinion cited to this case in
finding that the word "or" must not be ignored.9" In light of the argu-
ments above, however, it appears more appropriate that Menasche be di-
rected at the word "consent."
Consent is defined as "compliance or approval especially of what is
done or proposed by another."92 It follows that in order to demonstrate
lack of consent to a given act or practice, knowledge of that act or prac-
tice would normally be required.93 Therefore, an interpretation of
"knowledge or consent" by which knowledge alone would deny a claim-
ant innocent owner status would render the word "consent" mere sur-
plusage. In trying to show lack of consent, the claimant is burdened with
a knowledge predicate. In a conjunctive interpretation of the statute,
however, that very knowledge would deny the claimant the status of in-
nocent ownership. In establishing one side of the defense, the claimant
would necessarily preclude himself from the other.
Despite the lack of clarity in the legislative history, it does not seem
reasonable to assume that Congress would use the word "consent" sim-
ply to reinforce a required condition of lack of knowledge. Menasche
indicates that each word in a statute must be given significance.9" A con-
junctive interpretation of "without knowledge or consent," however,
would essentially convert that phrase to "without knowledge." A dis-
89. 348 U.S. 528 (1955).
90. Id. at 538-39 (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882)); see also
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (citing Menasche).
91. See United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Lib-
erty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
92. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 482 (1986 Unabridged).
93. See United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886
F.2d 618, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1989).
The following example illustrates a possible exception to this idea. Five men conspire
to traffic in narcotics. One of them, the claimant, is troubled by the obvious illegality of
the enterprise and tells the others that he refuses to have his home used or connected to
the dealing in any way. While away for the weekend, the other four make a large transac-
tion from the claimants house. The transaction leads to a forfeiture proceeding in which
the claimant tries to prove he was an innocent owner. In this case, it seems possible that
the claimant has demonstrated lack of consent, even though he had no knowledge of the
act. To so conclude would, of course, require a very narrow interpretation of knowledge.
In the broader sense, claimant did have knowledge of the act because he was aware of
the conspiracy and knew that the goal of the conspiracy was to engage in narcotics trans-
actions. One could also argue that the claimant must have had knowledge of the act, or
at least of the strong possibility that it would occur, because otherwise he would not have
bothered to request that his partners not use his home.
94. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
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junctive interpretation allows each term independent significance, and is
thus more viable.95
In addition, policy considerations strongly suggest that a disjunctive
interpretation of "knowledge or consent" is appropriate. Consider the
example of a landlord who owns property in a city. He knows that drug
trafficking is taking place in his building. He does his best to stop the
activity: he bolts the doors and calls the police. It would be unfair to
disallow such a landlord innocent owner status merely because he knew
about the drug dealing. Likewise, consider a person whose spouse is sell-
ing drugs from their jointly-owned home.96 The person knows about the
drug dealing and tries to convince his or her spouse to discontinue the
practice, and perhaps threatens to call the authorities. It would be unfair
to deny such a person the chance to attain innocent owner status simply
based on their knowledge of the illegal activity.
In adopting the innocent owner defense, Congress intended to exempt
innocent owners from the otherwise harsh results of forfeiture.97 If
courts adopt a disjunctive interpretation of the statute, the owner would
have a chance to demonstrate issues of material fact with regard to his
"lack of consent" and therefore avoid summary judgment of forfeiture.
This outcome is clearly more in keeping with Congress' purpose in creat-
ing the defense.
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES LACK OF CONSENT
Having decided that the claimant should have an opportunity to prove
lack of consent in the event of failing to show lack of knowledge,9 two
95. See, e.g., Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 668, 673
(9th Cir. 1978) ("Statutes should not be construed so as to make mere surplusage of any
of the provisions included therein.").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1415-16 (N.D. Ala.
1990); United States v. Real Property Known as 19026 Oakmont So. Drive, 715 F. Supp.
233, 235 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
97. Cf. Remarks of Senator Culver, 124 Cong. Rec. 23056 (1978) (discussing ration-
ale for innocent owner defense in section 881(a)(6)).
98. If the claimant is successful in showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
he lacked knowledge of the proscribed activity, then, of course, there is no need to ad-
dress the lack of consent issue. Under the disjunctive construction of the innocent owner
defense, the claimant need only show that he lacked either knowledge or consent in order
to prevail.
An interesting question is whether a claimant must show the lack of objective or sub-
jective knowledge of the proscribed activity for innocent owner purposes. That is, can an
owner rely on the fact that he did not know-even though he should have known-about
the proscribed use of his property for purposes of proving "lack of knowledge" under the
defense? Most authorities hold a claimant to a subjective, or actual knowledge, standard.
See United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895,
906 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. Parcel of Real
Property Known as 3201 Caughey Road, 715 F. Supp. 131, 133 (W.D. Pa. 1989). To
require that a landlord show both lack of objective and subjective knowledge-that is, to
require that a landlord not know nor have reason to know-about the proscribed use of
the property would pose too heavy a burden on that landlord. See Strafer, Civil Forfeit-
ures: Protecting the Innocent Owner, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 841, 847 (1985). Therefore, a
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additional questions must be addressed: What must an owner do to es-
tablish lack of consent, and what standard should courts use to judge a
particular owner's claims? Courts have given inconsistent answers to
these questions. The difference in approach turns upon the incorporation
of the constitutional defense of innocent ownership established from dic-
tum in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.99
Calero-Toledo involved the forfeiture of a yacht under a Puerto Rican
statute modeled after section 88 1(a)(4). °° The owner, who lived in New
York City, leased a boat to two residents of Puerto Rico under a five-year
lease. The boat was seized by Puerto Rican authorities after one mari-
juana cigarette was found in the hold. 101 The owner (lessor), who had no
knowledge of the forfeiture until he tried to repossess the yacht for non-
payment of rent, sued for the return of his boat and a declaration that the
statute under which it was seized was uncoustitutional. A three-judge
district court, relying primarily on Fuentes v. Shevin,102 held the statute
unconstitutional because it failed to provide for pre-seizure notice and
hearing.103 The United States Supreme Court reversed the district
court. 104
subjective standard is more reasonable than an objective standard in this context. See
also Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil
Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 Va. L. Rev. 165, 188-89 (1990) (discussing the standard of
knowledge question).
In certain circumstances, however, knowledge should be imputed to the owner, despite
the fact that he lacks actual knowledge. Thus, where a landlord's agent, such as a super-
intendent or building manager, has knowledge of the illegal activity, such knowledge
should be attributed to the landlord for innocent owner purposes. See United States v.
Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
Likewise, where the owner's lack of knowledge is due to conscious indifference or will-
ful ignorance, knowledge should clearly be imputed. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell,
532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.) (deliberate ignorance held equivalent to positive knowledge),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 776 (2d ed. 1969) (same); G.
Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part § 57, at 157 (2d ed. 1961) ("if a party has his
suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he
wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge"); Edwards, The Crimi-
nal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294, 298 (1954) ("a person who deliberately
shuts his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge" will satisfy the "knowingly" aspect of
mens rea). Where knowledge is imputed on the basis of deliberate ignorance, the claim-
ant would still have an opportunity to show lack of consent. As a practical matter, how-
ever, lack of consent would be extremely difficult to establish under these circumstances,
because it would be difficult to distinguish deliberate ignorance from approval.
99. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
100. See Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 24, §§ 2512
(a)(4), 2512(b) (1980). Note that unlike § 881(a)(4), the Puerto Rican statute did not
have any statutory defenses.
101. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 693 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
102. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
103. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669.
104. Despite the holding in Fuentes, the Court noted that "in limited circumstances,
immediate seizure of a property interest, without an opportunity for prior hearing, is
constitutionally permissible." Id. at 678. Citing the strong state interest in enforcement
of drug laws, the fact that the government, as opposed to a self-interested private con-
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The Court reinforced the proposition that the innocence of the owner
in a forfeiture proceeding is almost uniformly rejected as a defense.105 In
now-famous dicta, however, the Court discussed two circumstances in
which the innocent owner may have a defense to a civil forfeiture action.
The first occurs when the property subject to forfeiture has been stolen
from the owner.'16 The second-and more important in terms of section
881(a)(7)-is when the owner was uninvolved and unaware of the illegal
activity, and had taken all reasonable steps to prevent the proscribed use
of his property.10 7 The second exception from the dicta in Calero-Toledo
(the "Calero-Toledo defense") has since been incorporated into a large
number of civil forfeiture cases brought under sections 881(a)(4) and
881(a)(6).10 8
cern, was forfeiting the property, and the mobile nature of a yacht, the Court held that
the circumstances in Calero-Toledo were such that a pre-hearing seizure was justified.
See id. at 679-80.
105. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
106. The Court stated:
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose prop-
erty subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or con-
sent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that
he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfei-
ture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., United States v. One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 644 F. Supp. 1280, 1285-86
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing cases).
The Calero-Toledo defense is widely applied in forfeitures brought under section
881(a)(4). See United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 888
(11 th Cir. 1989); United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d
947, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. One Brown 1978 Mercedes Benz, 657 F.
Supp. 316, 319 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd mem., 837 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1987); One 1981 Datsun
280ZX, 644 F. Supp. at 1285. But see United States v. One 1985 BMW, 696 F. Supp.
336, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (dicta suggesting that "[tihere is really no room for the insertion
of the Calero-Toledo defense into Section 881(a)(4) as a matter of statutory construc-
tion").
Recently, section 881(a)(4) was amended to include an innocent owner provision simi-
lar to those in sections 881(a)(6) and (a)(7). Subsection (a)(4)(C) states:
[N]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner
to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful
blindness of that owner.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6075, 102 Stat. 4324. At least
one case has suggested that this new language creates a broader defense to forfeiture than
that afforded by the Calero-Toledo constitutionally-based defense. See United States v.
One 1982 Oldsmobile Cutlass, 709 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 n.4 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
Courts have taken different positions on the issue of incorporating the Calero-Toledo
dicta into the affirmative defense in section 881(a)(6). Compare United States v. One
Urban Lot, 865 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1989) (not incorporating Calero-Toledo, court
concludes that section 881(a)(6) "does not in any way limit innocent owners to those who
have done 'all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the
property' ") (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689) with United States v. One Single
Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (incorporating Calero-Toledo,
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Federal courts have inconsistently applied the Calero-Toledo defense
to section 881(a)(7) innocent owner cases. Some courts incorporate the
entire defense and require a claimant to show not only that he was
uninvolved and lacked knowledge, but also that he did everything he rea-
sonably could have done to prevent the illegal use of the real property. 1 9
Other courts have expressly rejected the incorporation of the Calero-To-
ledo defense into the analysis under section 881(a)(7). °10 In rejecting
Calero-Toledo, however, some of these courts rest on the very statutory
language at issue and simply state that the owner need only show that he
lacked "knowledge or consent" to the proscribed acts. 1 This does little
to resolve, and in fact merely poses anew, the question of what consti-
tutes lack of consent under the innocent owner defense.
The "reasonableness" standard 12 in Calero-Toledo should apply to the
court concludes that "claimant must demonstrate both that it lacked actual knowledge
and that it did everything reasonably possible [to avoid the proscribed use of his prop-
erty]"). A few courts have recognized the issue, but found it unnecessary to rule on the
incorporation question because the cases could be disposed of on other grounds. See
United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906
n.24 (1lth Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. $47,875.00 in
United States Currency, 746 F.2d 291, 292 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984).
109. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46 Street, 715
F. Supp. 355, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (claimant must show that "she did not know of the
property's connection to drug trafficking, and that she took every reasonable precaution
to prevent the property's use in drug trafficking"); United States v. One Single Family
Residence, 699 F. Supp. 1531, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (to claim innocent ownership claim-
ant must prove that she "did not know of the property's connection to drug trafficking,
and that she took every reasonable precaution to prevent the property's use in drug traf-
ficking"), aff'd 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Real Property Located at
2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988) ("The innocent owner defense
applies only to owners who can show that they did not know and had no reason to know
of the illegal use; were uninvolved in the illegal use; and did all that could reasonably be
expected to preclude or discover the illegal use."); United States v. Two Tracts of Real
Property Containing 30.80 Acres, Etc., 665 F. Supp. 422, 425 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (section
881(a)(7) innocent owner defense "fully comports" with the Court's reasoning in Calero-
Toledo), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14, and 15, 869 F.2d 942, 947 (6th Cir.
1989)-(dicta stating that section 881(a) imposes no duty on the claimant to comply with
the Calero-Toledo standard: "It is enough, under the statute, that the owner establish that
the proscribed act was committed 'without the knowledge or consent of that owner.' ")
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)); United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414,
1420 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (Calero-Toledo does not apply to section 881(a)(7)); United States
v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ("the tripartite test set
forth in Calero-Toledo is inapplicable when the 'innocent owner' defense is being claimed
under 21 U.S.C.A. Section 881(a)(7)").
111. See Lots 12, 13, 14, and 15, 869 F.2d at 947; Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp.
908 at 916.
112. The "reasonable precaution" standard, or third element of the Calero-Toledo de-
fense, states that an owner must have "done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974) (emphasis added).
The Calero-Toledo defense has three parts: the claimant must show that he was (1)
unaware and (2) uninvolved in the illegal activity, and that (3) he took all reasonable
precautions to prevent it. See supra note 106. Application of the entire. Calero-Toledo
defense creates the logically troublesome effect of having to prevent an event of which
1989]
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section 881(a)(7) innocent owner defense. The intent of Congress in
passing section 881(a)(7) was to expand the use of a tough forfeiture
scheme to encompass real property as such.11 3 The case law demon-
strates, however, that difficult questions arise when the government's in-
terest in fighting drugs through forfeiture is pitted against interests
particular to real property ownership.1 14 The Calero-Toledo standard
would allow courts to balance the competing interests of the government
and property owners inherent in a forfeiture scheme directed at real
property.
The innocent owner defense is raised in two common factual settings.
In the first, a landlord attempts to avoid forfeiture by claiming innocent
owner status.'1 5 Landlords should be under an obligation to do "all that
reasonably could be expected" to prevent the criminal use of their prop-
erty.116 Placing an affirmative burden on landlords would encourage
them to manage their land and buildings responsibly and conscientiously.
On the other hand, it would be unrealistic to expect a landlord to enlist
as an "active soldier" in the war against drugs to prevent the forfeiture of
his building."1 7 The Calero-Toledo standard, although demanding mean-
ingful action on the part of the landlord, does not require such a patently
unreasonable step.
The second factual setting in which an innocent owner claim often
arises occurs when an "innocent spouse" attempts to avoid the forfeiture
of their home brought about by the narcotics related activities of their
husband or wife. In such a case the issue of spousal loyalty, or perhaps
intimidation, complicates the question of what should be considered suf-
ficient lack of consent and clearly demonstrates the need for a flexible
test.1 18 As courts traditionally have protected the privacy of marital rela-
you were unaware. To the extent that the entire defense requires the claimant to lack
both knowledge and consent, it is inconsistent with a disjunctive interpretation of section
881(a)(7).
113. See Senate Report, supra note 40. Previously, real property was subject to forfei-
ture under section 881 only if was shown to constitute "proceeds" of a drug transaction
pursuant to section 881(a)(6).
114. See infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
115. See United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Lib-
erty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
116. See United States v. Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108,
110 (S.D. Tex. 1988). The court herein states that "[a] landlord cannot escape accounta-
bility to the community in which he operates by refusing to investigate suspicious facts
and allegations of illegal use." Id.
117. See Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. at 51.
118. For instance, courts have expressed hesitation at the idea that an innocent spouse
would have to file for divorce or seek a partition of the tenancy by the entirety in order to
prove lack of consent. See, e.g., United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109
Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 627 (3d Cir. 1989) ("the government's suggestion that an
innocent spouse should seek partition of the entireties property not only lacks legal sub-
stance but, in any event, defies marital reality"); United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F.
Supp. 1414, 1421 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (expressing doubt that claimant "was required to seek
a divorce in order to divorce herself from [the impending forfeiture]").
Confronted with a "lack of consent" issue in an "innocent spouse" case, the court in
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tions,119 and given the realities of marital life, courts should allow an
innocent spouse to prove lack of consent more easily than a landlord or
other non-domestic claimant. An innocent spouse should not, however,
be able to hide behind marital status to avoid an otherwise justified forfei-
ture. "At some point the obligations of citizenship in a drug ridden soci-
ety must overcome spousal loyalty and even spousal intimidation."12
Again, the Calero-Toledo test would allow courts to hold the spouse to
such "obligations," while factoring in what can reasonably be expected of
a spouse under the circumstances.
The drug crisis in this country demands a strict drug enforcement pol-
icy. The innocent owner defense should not be available to those who
simply turn their heads and look the other way, nor to those who make
merely perfunctory attempts to prevent the illegal use of their prop-
erty. 12 1 On the other hand, the variety of factual contexts present in in-
nocent owner claims suggests that the standard for lack of consent
should be flexible. The Calero-Toledo standard demands positive steps to
prevent the illegal use of property from those who seek innocent owner
status. Yet its basic operative context is one of reasonableness.122 The
test thus allows courts to demand meaningful action in response to the
drug-related use of property, guided by the cultural and legal expecta-
tions of the claimant in determining whether reasonable precautions have
been taken.'
23
Sixty Acres fell short of adopting the Calero-Toledo standard and attempted to "make a
nice distinction between doing everything reasonably necessary to stop the proscribed ac-
tivity and doing at least something to stop it." Id. at 1420. Yet the court's holding did
not set forth any clear standard that other courts could follow. Rather, limiting itself
strictly to the facts of the case before it, the court held that "[w]ithout speculating on
what exactly [claimant] should have done, this court is satisfied that she could have done
something which she did not do to keep from exposing her property to forfeiture." Id. at
1421. The court noted the difficult nature of the legal and factual issues in the case and
suggested that "[i]t may be the case in which the Eleventh Circuit will establish the law of
the Eleventh Circuit as to what constitutes 'consent' as that word is employed in
§ 881(a)(7)." Id.
119. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") (quoting Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 53 (1980) (fostering and protecting the sanctity of marriage relationship is goal behind
rule that witness may not be compelled to testify against his or her spouse).
120. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. at 1420.
121. See id. at 1421.
122. See United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft, 750 F.2d 1280, 1289 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985). The court stated that the burden
under Calero-Toledo "cannot be defined in precise, universal terms. Its operative tex-
ture-reasonableness-depends on the facts of the particular situation to which it is ap-
plied. We can only observe that 'reasonably' is woven into the stout fabric of 'all that
could be expected.' The standard was intended to be high." Id.
123. Although Congress has never expressly incorporated the Calero-Toledo standard
into its civil forfeiture scheme, language from a recently passed forfeiture provision pro-
vides what might be congressional recognition, if not approval, of the test. In section




Application of section 881(a)(7) poses several difficult problems. Fed-
eral courts, seeking to harness forfeiture's potential as a weapon against
drugs, have applied section 881(a)(7) employing inconsistent standards
and different constructions of the statutory language. The analysis pro-
posed by this Note suggests that (1) only property substantially con-
nected with a narcotics violation be subject to forfeiture; (2) failure to
establish "lack of knowledge" not preclude a claimant from innocent
owner status; and (3) "lack of consent" be evaluated under the Calero-
Toledo standard of reasonable precaution.
The policy reinforced by this approach is the conscientious manage-
ment and use of property. The drug trade flourishes in part because real
property provides sites for the storage and distribution of drugs. While
property rights must be respected, so must society's right to combat the
drug trade. The proposed approach balances the interests of property
owners with society's interests, which ensures that real property forfei-
ture will continue to be an effective weapon in the war against drugs.
Lalit K. Loomba
ments for the return of property seized because of the possession of personal use quanti-
ties of a controlled substance. Section 6079(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
[T]he appropriate agency official rendering a final determination shall immedi-
ately return the property if the following conditions are established:...
(C)(2) if the owner at any time had, or should have had, knowledge or reason to
believe that the property in which the owner claims an interest was being or
would be used in a violation of the law, that the owner did what reasonably
could be expected to prevent the violation.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6079, 102 Stat. 4325-26 (em-
phasis added).
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